The Great Recession of 2008 offers a primary example of the important role that fluctuations in credit risk play in the aggregate economy. In this paper we explore this link with a tractable general equilibrium asset pricing model with heterogeneous firms. Our model produces realistic movements in risk premia in equity and corporate bond markets and shows how this is an important determinant of aggregate fluctuations following both technology and pure credit shocks. We also show that movements in credit spreads forecast recessions by predicting future movements in corporate investment.
By integrating corporate investment and capital structure decisions into an asset pricing model, we endogenously link movements in aggregate quantities such as investment and output to the prices of stocks and bonds. As a result we show that movements in financial variables such as credit spreads and expected equity returns will forecast future economic activity.
Unlike almost all existing macro models however, movements in credit prices in our model are largely driven by fluctuations in credit risk premia and not solely by changes in average default rates. Intuitively this happens because, in our model, default losses occurs precisely when marginal utility is high, exacerbating the countercyclical nature of credit spreads. Moreover, in our equilibrium setting, endogenous and costly default increases the volatility of consumption in recessions, thereby rendering the market price of risk sharply countercyclical as well. By contrast, macroeconomic models relying solely on variation in aggregate default rates usually generate unrealistic levels and cyclical patterns for credit spreads and leverage ratios.
Because investors require higher compensation for default risk in bad times, firms find it especially costly to obtain debt financing, thereby depressing investment and output while amplifying macroeconomic shocks. Risk premia in corporate bond markets are thus propagated into the real economy and generate a strong correlation between observed credit spreads and macro aggregates. In our model the credit risk premium emerges as the common link between credit markets, equity markets and macroeconomic aggregates.
The joint endogeneity of credit risk and macro quantities also implies that, in our model, both the IES and risk aversion matter separately for aggregate quantities, a result that contrasts with the more common view in the macro literature where risk aversion (and risk premia) is generally ignored. 
Production Sector
The production sector of the economy is made of a continuum of firms that differ in their productivity, size and leverage among other characteristics. In characterizing the problem of firms in this section we take the stochastic discount factor for the economy as given. Later we show how this is determined in general equilibrium by the optimal consumption and savings decisions of households.
Technology and Investment
All firms produce the same homogeneous final good that can be used for either consumption or investment. The production function denoting the instantaneous flow of output is described by the expression:
where x and z denote the values of aggregate and firm specific productivity, respectively. The behavior of these follows a first order autoregressive process with normal innovations:
log(x t ) = ρ x log(x t−1 ) + σ x v xt , log(z t ) = ρ z log(z t−1 ) + σ z v zt , where both v xt and v zt are independently and identically distributed shocks drawn from a standard normal distribution.
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The variable k denotes the firm's productive capacity. This capacity is installed when the firm begins to operate and remains fixed throughout the life of the firm. These 9 A small but growing literature has begun to investigate the importance of non-normal or disaster shocks or even time variation in volatility (recent examples include Drechsler and Yaron (2010) and Gourio (2010) ). Although these features are absent from our shock processes, our model endogenously generates them in the aggregate quantities.
assumptions imply that our aggregate economy experiences stochastic and persistent variation in its growth rate over time through fluctuations in aggregate productivity, x t .
Firm Entry and Financing
New firms enter the market and start production if market conditions are sufficiently attractive. Entering firms draw the initial realization of the idiosyncratic shock z from its long-run invariant distribution, denoted G(z). For simplicity we assume that this value is only observed after entry. We further assume that entering firms are not immediately productive.
Entering firms must invest to build their productive capacity, k. This investment can be financed with either debt or equity finance. Debt takes the form of a consol bond that pays a fixed coupon bk as long as the firm is in existence and does not default on its obligations. Defining the coupon as bk allows us to interpret b as a measure of book leverage.
Equity Value and Exit
Given production and leverage the firm's per-period operating profits are given by the expression:
To economize on notation let s denote the aggregate state of the economy, which includes the state of aggregate productivity, x. Taking the households pricing kernel, M, as given, the firm's equity value, V (s, z, k, b) after entering the economy is determined through the Bellman equation:
where τ is the marginal tax on corporate profits, adjusted for taxes on distributions and personal interest income and λ is an indicator function that takes the value of 0 when equity distributions are positive and captures the costs of issuing any new equity. As usual we have used the notation s to denote the future value of s. Finally note that our assumptions about the nature of cash flows implies that equity value is linear in k.
Thus we can work instead with the market to book ratio:
The Bellman equation (3) implies that equity holders will default on their debt obligations when equity value falls to zero. This yields a default cutoff value for the idiosyncratic shock,z d (s, b) , such that the firm will default whenever z <z d (s, b) . Formally, we define this default threshold with the condition:
Value of Debt and Credit Spreads
Bondholders receive the coupon bk when the firm does not default. If the firm defaults its current assets (capital plus current output) are liquidated and the proceeds are used to pay the creditors. We assume however that a fraction φ is lost in liquidation. Formally then, we can define the market value of debt, B (s, z, b) , normalized per unit of capital k, in recursive form as follows:
Here χ is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 when the firm defaults so that
It is now straightforward to define the yield y(s, z, b) on corporate debt as:
To construct measures of the credit spread for this economy we compare this yield with that on a riskless bond of identical maturity. Formally then, our measure of credit spreads is:
where y f (s, z, b) is the yield on a bond of identical characteristics but assuming no default occurs. This risk free bond is then similar to a AAA rated bond instead of a pure treasury.
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Entry and Investment
Each period a mass of potential new entrants arrives in the economy. Each of these firms is endowed with an investment opportunity that expires at the end of the current period.
Given the expression for equity and debt value, the expected value of entry for any of these firms, is given by the expression:
New entrants build up the required productive capacity, k, by incurring a unit cost of installation e. This cost is randomly drawn from a continuous uniform distribution H(e) which is defined over the interval interval [0, E(x) ]. Thus, at any point in time,
there is a mass 1/E(x) of potential new firms that may enter the market by purchasing k units of capital at cost e. As we will see below only those firms drawing relatively low costs, or good investment projects, will find it optimal to start producing. 
Optimal Capital Structure
Each individual firm finances their initial purchases of capital using a mix of debt and equity. This initial capital structure is chosen to maximize the expected total value of the firm (i.e. debt plus equity). Formally this optimal ex-ante value of the firm A 0 (s)
is given by the expression:
It follows from this that each potential entrant will enter the economy if and only if the setup cost e is less or equal the ex ante firm value A 0 (s). Formally then entry occurs whenever e ≤ē(s) = A 0 (s)
It is easy to show that the value of entry A 0 (s) rises with x) so that the entry cutoffē 2 (s) will be strongly procyclical. This implies that the relatively costly projects are only adopted in good times. By contrast during recessions only low e projects are implemented. Below we show how optimal entry by individual firms determines the behavior of aggregate investment in equilibrium.
To summarize the optimal behavior of each individual firm is characterized by:
• The optimal entry cutoff,ē(s), implied by condition (11),
• An optimal leverage choice, b =b(s) implied by (10), and
These definitions make it clear however that all individual firm decisions will depend on the aggregate state of the economy, s. This state needs to be determined in general equilibrium and is the key difficulty in solving these classes of models.
Aggregation
To characterize the general equilibrium of the model we start by aggregating the optimal policies of each individual firm to construct aggregate quantities for our economy. We begin by defining μ t (b, z) as the cross-sectional distribution of firms over leverage and idiosyncratic shocks. Since capital k is installed upon entry and does not vary afterwards all of firm heterogeneity is restricted to different choices of b and draws of z. We use the subscript t to emphasize that the distribution μ(·) will also move over time according to the state of aggregate economy.
We construct aggregate output in this economy as follows:
Aggregate investment in the economy is given by the sum of the initial setup costs for the entering firms:
where we have used the fact that H(e) is uniform.
This quadratic expression is similar to those obtained in simple aggregate macro models with ad-hoc adjustment costs. Moreover, because in equilibriumē 2 (s) is procyclical, aggregate investment in our model will behave much in the same way. As shown by several authors the costly transformation between consumption and capital goods is 11 For simplicity in our model the behavior of aggregate investment is directly linked to new entry. This enhances tractability by ensuring that variation in firm capacity does not add to existing cross-sectional heterogeneity. However we could easily augment this by adding a required maintenance investment δk to incumbents as well.
another important element in generating sufficient variation in the price of financial assets in production economies
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As we have noted above allowing E(x) to change over time introduces variation in the average quality of available projects. and will affect the volatility of investment expenditures over the business cycle. For example allowing for E(x) to be countercyclical, so that more good projects are available in good times, implies that aggregate investment will respond more to underlying shocks.
An additional variable of interest is the deadweight losses associated with bankruptcy which is given by
Finally we can also construct the aggregate market value of corporate equity and debt respectively with the expressions:
and
These definitions for the aggregate quantities allow us to identify the aggregate state of our economy s more specifically with the pair (x, μ). Intuitively this means that all aggregate quantities and prices will depend not only on the average state of productivity (or profits) but also on the cross-sectional variation in firm productivities and balance sheet positions.
12 An early discussion is offered in Jermann (1997). For recent applications in similar settings see Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer(2010) and Croce(2010). Our formulation here is closer to Gomes, Kogan and Zhang (2004).
Households
We now close our general equilibrium model by describing in detail the behavior and constraints faced by the households/investors. We assume that our economy is populated by a competitive representative agent household, that derives utility from the consumption flow of the single consumption good, C t . This representative household maximizes the discounted value of future utility flows, defined through the Epstein-Zin (1991) and Weil (1990) recursive function:
The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) is the household's subjective discount factor and γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The parameter σ ≥ 0 denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and κ
Our household invests in shares of each existing firm as well as riskless bond which in zero net supply and earns a period rate of interest r t . We also assume that there are no constraints on short sales or borrowing and that households receive the proceeds of corporate income taxes as a lump-sum rebate equal to:
Given these assumptions the equilibrium stochastic discount factor for our economy between two adjacent periods is defined by the expression:
where
is the return on total household wealth, including bonds and tax proceeds.
As is well known, the absence of arbitrage implies that all gross asset returns in this economy will satisfy:
for all assets i.
Equilibrium
We have shown how investor behavior determines the equilibrium stochastic discount factor, M t,t+s , given household wealth. Earlier we described optimal firm behavior given the stochastic discount factor and shown how it determines aggregate investment and output as well as household wealth. Ensuring consistency between these two pieces of the economy requires that aggregate consumption by households is equal to aggregate production, net of investment and deadweight losses. Formally our competitive equilibrium can then be constructed by imposing the additional consistency condition:
This ensures that the stochastic discount factor used by each firm corresponds to that implied by optimal household behavior.
Computation
This section provides a brief description of our approach to solve the model in section 2 and our choice of parameter values. Although the model is relatively parsimonious the computation of the competitive equilibrium is difficult because the cross-section measure of firms μ(·) changes over time.
Computing the competitive equilibrium requires the following three basic steps:
• Given an initial stochastic discount factor M t,t+s solve the problem of each individual firms and determine the optimal level of entry and default
• Aggregate individual firm decisions and use the consistency condition (21) to compute aggregate consumption and wealth
• Ensure that the implied aggregate quantities are consistent with the initial process
Convergence of this procedure delivers the equilibrium values for all individual and aggregate quantities in the model. The appendix described this procedure in more detail. Table 1 reports the parameters that we use for our benchmark numerical analysis. The preference parameters β, γ and σ are chosen to ensure that the model matches the key properties of the risk free rate and the aggregate equity premium in the economy.
Parameter Choices
Several studies have shown how to combine time non-separable preferences and persistent shocks to aggregate growth to produce these results. Our contribution here is simply to show how these dynamics can arise endogenously in general equilibrium. In fact parameter values are quite similar to several papers in this literature.
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To pin down the volatility and persistence of the aggregate productivity process we require that our model matches the volatility and persistence of output growth in the data. This implies that ρ x = 0.96 and σ x = 0.01. The parameters for idiosyncratic shocks determine the amount of cross-sectional variation in firm heterogeneity. Since we are especially concerned with the role of leverage and credit spreads in our economy we set these parameters to match the unconditional means of both of these variables.
Thus we choose the value of ρ z = 0.94 and σ z = 0.2
As we have discussed earlier the upper bound on installation costs E(x) is used to generate the appropriate volatility of aggregate investment. We do this by setting the elasticity of E(x) with respect to x equal to -0.25. 
Findings
We are now ready to describe our quantitative findings. We begin by summarizing the basic properties of the model by reporting the unconditional means and volatilities of the major aggregate quantities and asset prices. We then examine the model's implications for the behavior of financial variables over the business cycle and compare those with the available empirical evidence. Finally we investigate the role of credit spreads in predicting future movements in both macro quantities and in equity markets.
To construct the statistics reported below we solve the model by numerical dynamic programming as detailed in 3. We then simulate the implied equilibrium policies at monthly frequency to construct 1000 independent panels of 59 years each. Macroeconomic data is aggregated at the quarterly frequency to match the available data. Unless otherwise noted we always report the relevant empirical moments for the sample period between 1951 and 2009.
Basic Properties
The first panel in Table 2 reports the volatility of the key macroeconomic variables as well as the share of investment in GDP. We can see that our parameter choices imply a very close match between the model and the data along these dimensions. Not only is the share of investment (and consumption) plausible but both variables also seem to exhibit as much variability as in the actual data.
The lower panel in Table 2 documents the implied properties of the model for the unconditional means and volatilities of the risk free rate and the equity premium. As we can see, our model does a good job in replicating these facts. Both the level of the risk free rate and the equity premium are very close to those observed in the data, and this match does not require the very large movements in the risk free rate often associated with habit preferences. This is because the persistent stochastic variation in growth rates generated by our model increases the household's precautionary savings thereby lowering equilibrium interest rates.
While Bansal and Yaron (2004) have shown that accounting for long run movements in consumption and dividends, combined with preferences for a early resolution of uncertainty, delivers realistic risk premia in an endowment economy setting, this has proved harder to implement in general equilibrium production economies (Kaltenbrunner and
Lochstoer (2010), Campanale, Castro and Clementi (2009), Croce(2010) ). This is because in a production economy, general equilibrium restrictions usually tie dividends very closely to consumption, while empirically, dividends are much more volatile than consumption.
Financial leverage (endogenously) breaks the tight link between dividends and consumption and renders dividends an order of magnitude more volatile. This allows us to generate a realistic amount of stock market volatility which is crucial in matching the aggregate equity premia. Importantly our model also matches the very slow moving patterns in leverage (Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008)) and the long run movements in aggregate dividends observed in the data (Bansal and Yaron (2004)). Table 3 are all based on the average properties of the cross-sectional distribution of firms.
Credit Market Statistics
The Table shows that our model almost exactly matches the cross-sectional average market leverage (the ratio of book leverage to the value of market equity plus book leverage). Moreover the model also yields a realistic level of credit defaults in our model, and average credit spreads.
The observation of a low default rate given the substantial tax benefits to debt are often interpreted as evidence of under-leverage by firms. However our model is able to match the observed leverage ratios because firms anticipate having to make costly equity issues in times of low profits. As a result they will optimally choose lower leverage ratios ex ante.
As in recent work by Bhamra et al (2008) and Chen (2008) , macroeconomic fluctuations are crucial for generating realistic levels of credit spreads. In our model however, these fluctuations are driven by the endogenous interplay between investment and financing decisions in equilibrium. Firms entering the economy in booms will anticipate high profits in the future, which they optimally shield from taxes by tilting their capital structure towards debt financing. When the economy slips into a recession however, default rates increase and incumbents' bonds quickly loose value while credit spreads increase. Table 4 can be understood by examining the effects of aggregate productivity of the various variables.
Investment and Finance over the Business Cycle
Intuitively the persistence in the aggregate shocks implies a strongly pro-cyclical behavior in aggregate investment as new firms enter the market and build up productive capacity in anticipation of higher future profits. As a result the market value of firms (and especially of equity) is also strongly pro-cyclical implying a countercyclical pattern in market leverage.
Also intuitive is the behavior of both default rates and credit spreads which are strongly countercyclical since default is becomes less attractive when profits are temporarily high. As a result of this improvement in credit market conditions which leads book leverage will rise. This is because new entrants will choose a typically higher level of debt thus raising average leverage in the economy.
As in the data, firms are more likely to issue equity during good times in the model.
Two effects are at work here, and they work in opposite directions. In the model firms issue equity at entry to finance investment in productive capacity and later on they need to secure additional funds in times of low profits in order to cover coupon expenses. This later effect leads to countercyclical issues but quantitatively it is not very strong. Anticipating that issuing equity is particularly costly in bad times, firms shift their initial capital structure towards equity when entering the economy, which is more likely to happen in times of high profits, thus rendering aggregate equity issuances procyclical.
Amplification of Underlying Shocks
Figures 5-5 look at the impact of fluctuations in credit markets on key macroeconomic quantities. Figure 5 directly compares the response to exogenous shocks in our benchmark economy with levered firms, to the response in an alternative environment where all firms are financed with equity alone. We find that economic fluctuations are more pronounced with output, consumption and investment growth all responding between 35% to 50% more to an increase in the level of aggregate productivity. 14 Intuitively as the risk of default drops debt becomes very cheap allowing firms to increase their ex-ante value considerably by exploiting the available tax shields. This encourages firm creation and investment spending. Intuitively a negative shock has two effects. First, it directly lowers output by 14 The all-equity economy is constructed by examining the case where optimal leverage is 0 because there is no tax incentive to use debt.
lowering productivity and increasing default rates among incumbent firms. Second, widening credit spreads make debt expensive reducing the value of potential entrants and lowering investment spending. It is this second effect that is responsible for the asymmetric cycles. Because bond losses are concentrated in recessions credit risk raises sharply and credit spreads are much more sharply countercyclical here than in macro models relying on (effectively) risk-neutral investors.
Variation in risk premium matters for another reason. Because bankruptcy procedures are costly, investment is only partially reversible. This generates countercyclical variation in consumption growth and adds to the market price of risk in recessions and the variation in equilibrium credit spreads. 
Credit Market Shocks
Although we have focused only on technology driven fluctuations our model can readily accommodate several other types of shocks. In this section we show how to modify our benchmark formulation to capture the idea of an exogenous shock to "credit market 15 Formally we compare average recessions generated by a one standard deviation negative shock to
x. In the first case all firms start with the optimal amount of leverage implied by their policy rules. In the second case we endow firms with the optimal amount of leverage implied by setting x one standard deviation above its mean.
conditions". We can do this by assuming that the recovery rates in bankruptcy fluctuate over time, perhaps as a result of shocks to liquidation values or "liquidity".
16 Equation (6) shows that fluctuations in the recovery rate, φ, directly affect the relative price of credit to the firm so that we can also think of these liquidity shocks as simply credit market shocks.
Formally we now assume that φ can take two values: a benchmark value of 0.25 which we think approximates average bankruptcy costs and an extreme (but rare) value of 0.75 that occurs during liquidity crisis. We also assume that φ evolves over time according to a two-state Markov chain with the following transition probabilities:
In practice this means that liquidity crisis are both rare and temporary. Figure 5 shows the average response of output and investment to an unexpected tightening of credit conditions. This shock has several effects. First they devalue outstanding bonds and reduce household wealth. In general equilibrium this leads to a decline in equity values and increases corporate defaults. Hence output falls. This is an effect on incumbent firms. On the other hand higher bankruptcy costs makes debt significantly less attractive for potential entrants. Therefore the average ex ante firm value falls and less firms break even in expectation. This leads to less entry and less investment.
Comparing with the response to a standard technology shock however we see that a credit shock has a significantly larger impact on investment relative to output. Sensibly in our model fluctuations in credit conditions impact young (and small) firms much more than the older established ones. Again this is novel feature relative to many aggregate macro models that rely on borrowing constraints that affect all firms equally.
Credit Spreads and Business Cycle Predictability
Finally we examine the ability of credit markets, and in particular credit spreads, in forecasting movements in the aggregate economy. Tables 5 and 6 show the results of regressing the k period ahead growth in (log) output and investment, respectively, on the value weighted aggregate credit spread at time t. They show that credit spreads in our model are able to forecast movements in both aggregate output and investment at horizons ranging between 1 quarter and 1 year. This finding is consistent with much empirical evidence about the forecasting ability of credit spreads and documented recently in Mueller (2008), Gilchrist et al (2008) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) .
In both the data and the model the forecasts are both statistically and economically meaningful. Moreover the estimated coefficients on the simulated panels are of very similar magnitudes to those found in recent empirical studies.
The intuition for these results follows from the fact that the cyclical nature of consumption implies that investors will incur larger losses on defaulted bonds in recessions, precisely when marginal utility is high giving rise to sharply countercyclical credit spreads.
As a consequence firms find it especially costly to obtain debt financing during recessions. In our model, this makes it difficult for the young (new) firms to obtain funding for investment expenditures and depresses aggregate investment and output for a number of quarters thereafter. Risk premia in corporate bond markets are thus propagated into the real economy and this accounts for the predictive power of credit spreads for output and investment. Moreover these endogenous movements in risk premia also play a key role in amplifying underlying macroeconomic conditions. Thus credit risk premium emerges as the common link between credit markets, equity markets and macroeconomic aggregates.
Conclusion
In this paper we propose a tractable general equilibrium asset pricing model with heterogeneous firms that links movements in stock and bond markets to macroeconomic activity. The model endogenously links movements in aggregate quantities such as investment and output to the prices of stocks and bonds. As a result movements in financial variables such as credit spreads and expected equity returns will forecast future economic activity. In our model these movements are largely driven by risk premia.
In our equilibrium setting, endogenous default increases the volatility of consumption during recessions, thereby rendering the market price of risk sharply countercyclical.
As a consequence, expected returns on stocks are higher in recessions, which are naturally anticipated by movements in credit spreads. Endogenous movements in credit markets allow our model to match the observed conditional and unconditional movements in stock market returns and credit spreads with a reasonable amount of aggregate volatility.
While a long theoretical literature in macroeconomics has demonstrated that financial frictions have the potential to deliver a powerful amplification mechanism for macroeconomic shocks, our mechanism here is quite distinct. Classical papers in this literature (e.g. Kyotaki and Moore (1997 ), Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist (1999 ), Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2004 and others) often emphasize the agency problems arising between investors and small entrepreneurial firms and focus on how changes in aggregate economic conditions exacerbate these frictions. Almost all of them however rely on sharp movements in default frequencies in risk neutral settings almost always generating sharply counterfactual properties for asset prices.
In contrast, in our model shocks are amplified through endogenous movements in credit risk premia that affects all corporations equally. As a result we can reconcile the core features of a business cycle contraction with the key properties of equity and credit markets. Our approach then seems to offer a more plausible mechanism for the role of financial markets in the propagation of the underlying shocks. 
Appendix: Computation Details
The computation of the competitive equilibrium is complicated by the endogeneity of the pricing kernel, which embodies the equilibrium market clearing conditions. The main difficulty of course is the dependence of all aggregate quantities on the cross-sectional distribution, μ, which is a high-dimensional object.
Our solution algorithm exploits two basic techniques to overcome these obstacles.
First, we re-normalize the value functions for debt and equity to express them in units of marginal utility which is computationally more convenient. Next, following Krusell and Smith (1998) , the cross-sectional distribution μ is approximated by a low-dimensional state variable that summarizes the relevant information in μ.
The expression for the pricing kernel (19) guides both our choice of the approximate state space and the re-normalizations. To that end, we define the function:
and rewrite the expression for the market-to-book value of equity aŝ
In an analogous way we can defineB (s, z, b) as the normalized market value of debt (relative to capital).
In the next step, we approximate the high-dimensional state space s = (x, μ) bŷ s ≡ (x, W ). In other words, we assume that aggregate household wealth W captures all the relevant information about aggregate quantities contained in the cross-sectional distribution μ.
We can then writê
whereĈ(x, W ) = C(ŝ) in our approximate state space.B (x, W, z, b) is also defined analogously.
Our numerical strategy is based on numerically iterating on the functional equationŝ Q andB. To that end, we parameterize the consumption functionĈ and the law of motion for aggregate wealth W as log linear functions of the aggregate state, x and W :
for some coefficient vectors α and η.
Following Krusell and Smith (1998), we guess an initial set of coefficients for these rules, and find the equilibrium rules by means of simulation. More precisely, we use the following procedure:
• Discretize the state space by choosing discrete grids for b and W , and the shocks x and z. Because the stochastic processes in our calibration are highly persistent, we discretize the shocks using the procedure detailed in Rouwenhorst (1995).
• Guess initial vectors α 0 and η 0
• Using these guesses iterate on the functional equations forV andB. This yields the optimal decision rules for investment, default and optimal capital structure.
• Simulate the optimal decisions rules and compute the implied general equilibrium allocations for C and W .
• Use the implied time series for x, C and W to update the approximate log linear rules for C and W and check the goodness of fit.
• Iterate until convergence.
For our simulation procedure we represent the distribution of firms at any time with We are interested in the evolution of M t over time, that is, in the mapping of M t into
M t is the end-of-period t distribution, with which the economy enters into period t + 1. We first need to account for default. For each aggregate state s = (x, w) the default decision can be characterized by a nz × nb matrix D with elements 1 if firms with coupon b j and shock z i survive, and 0 firms with coupon b j and shock z i default.
Aggregating over aggregate states this can be summarized with a three-dimensional array Df which is ns × nz × nb where ns = nx × nw = nb is the number if discrete aggregate states. The distribution of surviving firms is then given bỹ :, :) where .× denotes element-by-element multiplication. Next we consider the transition between idiosyncratic states. Note that existing firms only 'move' within the same columnM t+1 (:, j) as their coupon b j is fixed. With Markov transition matrix T z the new distribution of surviving firms over idiosyncratic states is therefore given bỹ
Now we need to consider entering firms. Their mass m e,t+1 is determined in equilibrium.
They draw their idiosyncratic shock realizations from the ergodic distribution of z.
They can be represented with a matrix N t+1 , with a non-zero column n t+1 = N t+1 (:
T e if the aggregate state at time t + 1 is l where T e represents the ergodic distribution of z, and zeros otherwise. The new end-of-period distribution is then 
